Are ex-post real interest rates a good proxy for ex-ante real rates? : an international comparison within a CCAPM framework by Ayuso Huertas, Juan & López Salido, J. David
ARE EX-POST REAL 
INTEREST RATES 
A GOOD PROXY 
FOR EX-ANTE REAL 
RATES?
 An international comparison 
within a CCAPM framework
Juan Ayuso and J. David López-Salido
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo nº 9710
ARE EX-POST REAL 
INTEREST RATES 
A. GOOD PROXY 
FOR EX-ANTE REAL 
RATES? 
An international comparison 
within a CCAPM framework 
Juan Ayuso and J. David LOpez-Salida (*) 
(*) We thank for helpful comments Jose Luis Escriva and Soledad Nunez. 
Banco de Espana - Servicio de Estudios 
Documento de Trabajo n' 9710 
In publishing this series the Banco de Espana seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those 
of the Banco de Espana. 
The Banco de Espana is disseminating some of its 
principal reports via INTERNET and INFOviA. 
The respective WWW server addresses are: 
http://www.bde.es and http://www.bde.inf. 
ISSN,0213-271O 
ISBN,84-7793-547-5 
Deposito legal: M. 19896-1997 
lmprenta del Banco de Espana 
ABSTRACT 
We use an integrated framework based on the CCAPM to jointly estimate 
ex-ante real interest rates, (bounds on) inflation risk premia and (bounds 
on) agents' inflation expectation errors in four countries -France, Spain, 
UK and US- under three different preference specifications. According to 
our results, I-year ex-ante real interest rates exhibit a rather low 
correlation with the I-year ex-post rate. For those ex-ante real rates 
showing the highest correlation with the ex-post real rate, the difference 
between both real rates seems to be mainly explained in terms of agents' 




Real interest rates are a critical variable in economics. They measure the 
real cost of capital, thus playing a crucial role in determining long-run 
output growth. Moreover, real as opposed to nominal interest rates 
determine agents' consumption and investment decisions. Thus, when 
central banks steer (short-term) nominal interest rates in order to attain 
monetary policy targets, disentangling the relationships between nominal 
interest rates, real interest rates and inflation expectations is crucial to. 
understand the relative importance of different channels in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. 
Unfortunately, real interest rates are non-observable and are usually 
proxied by the so-called ex·post real interest rates, i.e., the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the ex·post observed inflation rate. 
As is well known, however, ex·post rates include two disturbing 
components which can render them a misleading proxy for non-observable 
ex·ante real interest rates: inflation risk premia and agents' inflation 
expectation errors. Like ex·ante real interest rates, these two variables are 
also non-observable. 
There are reasons to think that both disturbances are probably negligible. 
First, inflation premia can hardly be relevant if the inflation rate is not 
very volatile. And second, if agents are rational when forming their 
inflation expectations, the expectation error should be zero on average. 
Although it is still an open question, this view has been recently 
challenged in the literature, particularly in relation to the magnitude of 
the inflation expectation error. Thus, a series of papers have found that, 
due to informational or to (monetary policy) credibility problems, inflation 
rates can be successfully characterised by switching-regime modefs 11 la 
Hamilton, not only in high-inflation countries like Argentina, Israel or 
Mexico (see Kaminsky and Leiderman, 1996) but also in countries whose 
inflation rates are lower and more stable like the US (Evans and Lewis, 
1995) or Canada (Bank of Canada, 1996). These switching-regime models 
produce inflation expectation errors which have zero-mean ex·ante but, ex· 
post, can show a non-zero mean. Similarly, according to King (1996) if 
agents do not immediately learn about central bank behaviour, 
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disinflationary processes will probably be characterised by inflation targets 
(and, therefore, by actual inflation) below agents' inflation expectations. 
Lasting inflation expectation errors are also predicted by models a la 
Backus-Driffill (1985) where central bankers face credibility problems and 
need time to build their anti-inflationary reputation. 
In this paper we use an integrated framework that provides a joint 
estimate of the ex-ante real interest rate, (bounds on) inflation premia and 
(bounds on) inflation .expectation errors, on the basis of the Consumption 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). This framework allows, first, for a 
comparison between ex-ante and ex-post real interest rates to analyse to 
what extent the latter are a good proxy for the former. Second, relative to 
other alternative methods that estimate ex·ante real interest rates, this 
approach also offers a simultaneous estimate of inflation premia and 
inflation expectation errors, thus providing an explanation of the 
discrepancies between both interest rates. This ability to analyse the three 
variables jointly is one of the advantages of this method. An additional 
advantage of our approach lies in its data requirements. All the results are 
obtained using information on non-durable consumption alone which, thus, 
acts as a sufficient statistic for the three non-observable variables. 
Most of the existing empirical evidence is not generally favourable to the 
CCAPM (see, for instance, Sentana 1993). Yet such evidence,is usually 
based on a joint test of the CCAPM and the isoelastic preference 
assumption for data on the US economy. When other preference 
specifications are considered, however, the evidence is more favourable to 
the CCAPM (see Cochrane and Hansen, 1992; and Campbell and 
Cochrane, 1995). The same applies when other economies are analysed 
(see Ayuso, 1996 for Spanish evidence, or Bakshi and Naka, 1997 for 
Japanese data). In this paper, we address this issue through the analysis 
of four countries and three alternative preference specifications. Moreover, 
we do not confine ourselves to any particular estimate of the parameters 
that characterise each utility function but consider, for each preference 
specification, a (sensible) set of values of the relevant parameters. Thus, 
we generate ex-ante real interest rates, inflation premia and inflation 
expectations under different assumptions, which allows for an analysis of 
the sensitivity of those variables to changes in important features in 
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agents' utility functions: time preference, risk aversion, intertemporal 
substitution, habits and keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effects. 
As usual in any calibration analysis, we look at the variance and 
correlation of the ex-post real rates and the (model-) generated ex-ante real 
rates under alternative utility functions and parameterizations. In doing 
so, we can select for each country in our sample the most suitable 
preference specification in terms of those statistics. Once we select the 
specification, we duly construct bounds on inflation expectations and risk 
premia. This allows us to discuss the sources of discrepancy between the 
ex-post real rates and the (model-)generated ex-ante rates. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly states the main 
theoretical relationships between ex-ante real interest rates, ex-post real 
interest rates, inflation risk premia and inflation expectation errors, 
within the CCAPM framework. Section 3 presents the empirical results, 
based on data from Spain, France, UK and US. These results show that, 
in general, ex-post real interest rates are a poor proxy for ex-ante real 
rates, the correlation between them being rather low. For those ex-ante 
real rates showing the highest correlation with the ex-post real rate, the 
different behaviour of both series seems to be mainly due to the existence 
of inflation expectation errors, while the inflation premia seem to play a 
minor role. Finally, Section 4 draws the main conclusions of the paper. 
2. NOMINAL INTEREST RATES, REAL INTEREST RATES, 
INFLATION PREMIA AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN A 
CCAPM FRAMEWORK. 
As is well-known, the CCAPM states that, in equilibrium, the expected 
returns on all financial assets must be the same, provided they are 
properly discounted. The model also gives the proper discount factor: the 
marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption. 
Formally, 
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[ II-' j] -Et MRSt+-1 t-+1 Rt+l 1, \;ft, ], [1] 
where MRS,., is the marginal rate of substitution between tomorrow's and 
today's consumption(l), II,., is the ratio between tomorrow's and today's 
price levels, RI., is today total 1-period-ahead return (including the 
principal returned) on asset j , and E, represents the expectation 
operator conditional on information available at t . 
For the purpose of this paper, we are interested in two particular financial 
assets. First, we consider a 1-period default-free zero-coupon bond. Its 
riskless nominal interest rate -i.e. known at t- is denoted by i, . Next, 
we also consider a perfectly indexed 1-period default-free zero-coupon 
bOnd. Its riskless real interest rate, known at t ,is denoted by r, . The 
latter can be understood as a "real bond" that returns units of 
consumption at its maturity date. It is seen that in those two cases 
equation [1) takes the following form: 
1, 'V t. [1. a] 
E,[MRS,., II�;,] (l+i,) = 1, 'V t. [l.b] 
Equations [l.a) and [l.b) impose statistical restrictions on the 
comovements between interest rates (nominal and real), expected inflation 
and consumption: 
1 [2] (1 + i,) 
Thus, this model provides a general framework to relate nominal and real 
interest rates. This relationship is, moreover, broadly consistent with the 
well-known Fisher equation. To illustrate that point in a simplified way, 
we can use the lognormal version of equation [2), i.e., the relationship 
among the relevant variables when MRS,." II�;, and RI., follow 
(1) That is, the time preference parameter p times the ratio of the 
marginal utilities of tomorrow's and today's consumption. 
- 8 -
lognormal distributions. In that case, it can be shown (se.e, for example, 
Evans and Watchel, 1992) that equation [2] can be rewritten as: 
where small letters denote logs of capital ones. Equation [2'] states that 
the nominal interest rate is positively related to the real interest rate and 
the expected inflation as in the conventional Fisher equation. But the 
conditional covariance between the ratio of marginal utilities to inflation 
also enters into this relationship. In fact, this term can be interpreted as 
an inflation risk premium(": if the covariance term is positive (negative), 
the nominal bonds provide a poor (good) hedge against unanticipated 
consumption changes and households require higher (lower) nominal 
interest rates. 
From expression [2'], and the usual definition of ex-post real rates: 
ex-post . 
It = �t - 'Jtt+l 
it is clear that inflation premium acts as a first potential wedge between 
the ex-post real interest rate r �x-post and the ex-ante real interest 
rate r t . But even if the inflation premium is nil, there might still be 
another wedge if agents do not perfectly forecast future inflation. Note, 
then, that if there is no inflation premium (and we obviate the Jensen 
inequality term) then 
The difference between the expected inflation rate and the observed one, 
i.e. the expectation error, will also contaminate the ex-post real interest 
rate. 
(2) The conditional variance is devoid of economic content, and appears 
as a consequence of the log-approximation due to the Jensen inequality. 
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As commented in the Introduction, ex-ante real interest rates, inflation 
premia and inflation expectation errors are non-observable_ Equations 
[La], [Lb] and [2] can be used to estimate them_ 
Real interest rates 
Real interest rates can be readily estimated under equation [La]: 
Vt_ [3 J 
Observe that, in order to estimate ex-ante real interest rates, we only need 
information on the stochastic discount factor MRS t., , Le. information on 
preferences and per-capita consumption. 
Bounds on inflation expectations and on inflation premia 
Estimating inflation expectations and inflation premia is not so 
straightforward. Nevertheless, it is still possible to derive bounds for 
inflation expectations through the implied bounds for the risk premium 
term in equation [2], as in Ireland (1996). 
Since the risk premium is a covariance, the following relationship holds: 
where P t and a t denote conditional correlation and conditional standard 
deviation, respectively. But the correlation coefficient must lie inside the 
interval [-1, 1]. Thus: 
[4J 
Under an additional assumption on inflation volatility, namely:(3) 
(3) According to the available empirical evidence (see Ireland, 1996 and 





at [n;:,] < Et [n;:,] [5] 
we can eliminate inflation from equation [4], thereby reducing our data 
requirements to consumption information. Thus, equations [l.a], [2], [4] 
and [5] yield 
(l+it) (Et[MRSt.,] - at[MRSt.,J) < {Etm;:,J}-' < 
[6] 
{Et[MRSt.,1 + at[MRSt.,J} (l+it) 
Since (Et m;:,) ) -, =Et (TIt.,) , equation [6] defines bounds on expected 
inflation that can be compared with observed inflation, thus providing 
bounds on the expectation errors. Observe that, as in the case of real 
interest rates, all we need to estimate those bounds is data on 
consumption and information on agents' preferences, in addition to data 
on nominal interest rates. Moreover, the width of the band for expected 
inflation also provides information on the magnitude of the inflation 
premium. Observe that by using equation [3], equation [6] can be 
rewritten as 
(1 + it) 
- (1 + it) at [MRSt.,] < {Et m;:,J}-' < (1 + r t) 
(l+it) + (l+it) at [MRSt.,] (1 + r t) 
and (1 +it) / (1 +rt) is the inflation expectation estimate provided the 
inflation premium is zero. Therefore, equation [6] yields a band for 
inflation expectations centred around the inflation expectation under risk 
neutrality, (half) the width of that band being the (absolute) maximum 
value for the inflation premium. 
As stated in the Introduction, the empirical performance of the CCAPM 
seems to depend on the chosen agents' utility functions. We close this 
section with a brief overview of three different utility functions -commonly 
used in the asset-pricing literature- that will be used later in the empirical 
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part of the paper.'" The first one is the well-known isoelastic utility 
function, and the other two encompass the isoelastic as a particular case. 
Constant relative risk aversion 
The most usual utility function in the financial literature is the isoelastic 
utility function: 
U 
_ C;-v-l , - -01'-- . -y y � 
1. 
where y = 1 implies the log utility function. Notice that preferences are 
not time-dependent and y measures both the household degree of 
(constant) relative risk aversion and the inverse of the (constant).elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution between future and current consumption.'s) 
It is easy to prove that, in this case 
[7J 
where 9,., = C,.,! c, 
Habit formation or durability 
A simple way of considering time dependence in preferences is assuming 
habits in household decisions. Following Constantinides (1990) and Heaton 
(1993), a parsimonious way of capturing these effects is to specify the 
following utility function: 
(4) See, for instance, Cochrane and Hansen (1992) and Kocherlakota 
(1996). 
• 
(6) In order to circumvent this restriction, we tried using the 
generalised isoelastic preferences proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and 
Weil (1990). The empirical implementation of this preference specification 
poses some problems (see Ayuso and L6pez-Salido, 1996) which can not be 
successfully addressed for all the countries concerned. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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(c - AC ),-y u = t t-l y <1 . t 1 Y , 
where A measures the degree of habits (durability when negative) and, 
for u, to be well defined, A < Min {g,l is assumed. (6) Notice that A> 0 
implies that it takes more consumption today to make an investor happier 
if he consumed more yesterday -i.e. he has habits. The degree of relative 
risk aversion is a function of y, A and g, , and the corresponding 
marginal rate of substitution is: 
(g",g,-Ag,) -y - A� (g",g,) -y (g",-A) -y 
(g,-A) -y - A�g;Y (g",-A)-Y 
Relative consumption' 
[8 J 
The last extension of household preferences we consider is the presence of 
externalities in the utility functions. In particular, following Abel (1990) 
or Gali (1994), household preferences may not only depend on own 
consumption but also on the aggregate (economy-wide) level of 
consumption. A simple way of capturing this is assuming the following 
utility function: 
U = , 
1-y C, � 
-- CC-l 1-y 
where c, is individual consumption at t , as opposed to per-capita 
consumption in the economy C, . A positive (negative) value of 4> implies 
that the individual is altruistic (invidious) in that the more the society 
consumes the better off (worse) he is.") In equilibrium, where individual 
and per-capita consumption coincide, the marginal rate of substitution 
takes the following form: 
(6) By setting A = 0 , these preferences reduce to the isoelastic utility 
function. 
(7) This utility function reduces to the isoelastic case when 4> = 0 • 
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[9J 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section we empirically address the question posed in the title of the 
paper. We consider 1 year as the empirical definition of the theoretical 
concept of "1 period" and therefore, we aim at estimating I-year ex-ante 
real interest rates and at bounding inflation expectation errors and 
inflation premia to this horizon. However, so as to increase the number of 
observations we use quarterly per-capita private non-durable consumption 
and CPl data on France, Spain, UK and US from 1970:1 to 1995:IV.(8) 
Moreover, in order to bound inflation expectations we also use the 
corresponding I-year nominal interest on public debt, except for Spain, for 
which the longest available series is the I-year domestic interbank market. 
Even so, the periods covered are 1970:1 to 1995:IV for UK and US, 1978:1 
to 1995:IV for France, but only 1979:IIl to 1995:IV for Spain.(" 
The strategy we propose for analysing the potential error when ex-post real 
interest rates are used instead of ex-ante real interest rates is the 
following. First, for each of the three considered preference specifications, 
we choose a sensible range for the parameters involved. For each 
parameter set, we compute the corresponding ex-post marginal rate of 
substitution. Then, the expected MRS", is obtained as the forecast from 
an ARMA model for the ex-post marginal rate of substitution so 
(8) Our data source are the QNA of the OECD, but for Spanish data 
that have been provided by the INE. Notice that using quarterly data 
induces a data overlapping problem that is taken into account when 
obtaining the I-year ex-ante real interest rates. Figure 1 shows 
consumption growth patterns in each country. 
(9) We also tried using German data but we did not find data on non­
durable consumption and available data on total consumption showed 
strange patterns around German reunification difficult to address. 
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obtained. (10) Given that expectation, equation [3] immediately provides the 
corresponding model-generated 1-year ex-ante real interest rate. 
Next, we compare the different model-generated ex-ante real interest rates 
to the ex-post rate according to the following criterium. Unless there are 
implausible negative correlations between ex·ante real rates, inflation 
premia and inflation expectation errors, it is clear from Section 2 that the 
variance of the ex·ante real interest rate must be below that of the ex·post 
rate. Thus, we focus on those parameters yielding ex·ante real interest 
rates which fulfil that requirement. For those model-generated real rates, 
their correlation with the ex-post rate is then calculated. 
Finally, we investigate whether differences between ex-ante and ex-post 
real interest rates can be mainly explained in terms of inflation premia or 
inflation expectation errors. In doing that, we use the variance of the 4-
quarter-ahead forecasting error of the corresponding ARMA model for the 
marginal rate of substitution and the 1-year nominal interest rate to build 
bounds on inflation expectations (equation [6]). These bounds are then 
compared to ex-post observed 1-year inflation rate. Thus, if the observed 
inflation rate is outside the bounds we can infer that inflation expectation 
errors play an important role. On the contrary, inflation premia will be the 
main explanatory factor if the observed inflation is inside the bounds and 
these make up a narrow band. However, if the band is too wide and 
contains the observed inflation inside, nothing can be said about the 
relative importance of each wedge between ex-ante and ex-post real 
interest rates. 
3.1. Real Interest Rates 
As previously commented, we do not estimate agents' preferences but 
consider a reasonable range for the parameters involved. According to 
equations [7], [8] and [9], there are 4 parameters in our analysis. The first 
(10) Although data overlapping implies a MA(3) component, a long AR(8) 
proved to be enough to capture the correlation in the marginal rate of 
substitution series. 
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two are common to all utilities functions: � and y .  The remaining 
two, A and <p , are related to time non-separabilities in preferences. 
Regarding �.  it is important to note that it acts as a simple scale factor 
when ex-ante real interest rates are obtained. Thus, choosing a value 
for � does not affect the correlation between ex-ante and ex-post real 
rates, although it affects the variance comparisons. Accordingly, we first, 
.choose a value for � of .9588 in annual terms, which corresponds to a 
value of .9965 in monthly terms. Empirical support for the monthly figure 
can be found in Canova and Marrinan (1996) or Ayuso (1996). And second, 
the variance of the ex-post real rate is divided by � = • 9 588 in order to 
obtain an upper bound for the variances of the model-generated ex-ante 
real rates. This is equivalent to assuming � is equal to 1 when 
calculating the variance of the ex-ante real interest rate and therefore, to 
minimising that variance (i.e. maximising the probability of fulfilling the 
second moment requirement). Thereafter, changing � simply changes the 
mean level of the model-generated real interest rate, and therefore, we do 
not undertake any sensitivity analysis, nor comment on estimated real 
interest rate levels. 
As for y , five values are regarded: .1, .5, 1.5, 5 and 10. These values 
cover the most commonly considered range in the asset-pricing literature, 
varying from figures close to risk neutrality to high risk aversion cases. 
Turning now to A , its maximum value is bounded so as to guarantee a 
well-defined utility function. We consider a case of weak 
habits (A = .2) as well as a case of strong habits (A =.8) .(11) 
Although we use non-durable consumption, we also look at negative values 
for A (-.2 and -.8) to keep some symmetry in our analysis. Finally, 
four <p values are considered: .75, .25', -.25 and -.75. As before, we look at 
negative values (envy) as well as at positive ones (altruism). The 
maximum absolute value for <p has been chosen in such a way that, 
except for very high risk aversion, own consumption and social 
consumption have sensible weights in agents' utility function. 
(lll Notice that the possibility of negative consumption growth implied 
that the bound for A had to be below 1. 
. 
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Tables 1 to 4 summarise the results of our empirical comparisons in each 
country. In particular, they show the standard deviations of the different 
model-generated 1-year ex·ante real interest rates, as well as their 
correlations with the corresponding 1-year ex·post real interest rates. 
As can be seen, the four tables offer, in general, low correlation 
degrees.(12) This is particularly true for France and US for which the 
maximum correlations among those preference specifications satisfYing the 
variance criterium -shaded squares in the Tables- are .199 and .221, 
respectively. In Spain and UK maximum correlations are higher, but still 
low: .537 and .621. In all countries but France, the highest correlations are 
obtained when agents have habits in their preferences. Those habits are 
stronger for the US (A = . 8) than for Spain or UK ( ). = . 2) ."3) For 
France, Abel's preferences offer the best results. In any event, the 
isoelastic utility functions provide correlations not too distant from those 
obtained when more general preferences are considered. > 
The previous view of markedly different patterns of ex-ante and ex-post 
real interest rates is reinforced by Figure 2, which shows, for each country, 
the 1-year ex·post real interest rate and the (three) closest model­
generated ex-ante real rates for each utility function family, i.e. those 
showing the maximum correlation among those fulfilling the variance 
restriction. 
A clear message seems to emerge from tables 1 to 4 and from Figure 2, . 
Even allowing for a wide range of preference specification families and of 
utility function parameters, it is virtually impossible to generate an ex· 
ante real interest rate close enough to the ex·post one in any of the four 
countries considered. Accordingly, and always conditional on our general 
(12) In order to test whether this result is a consequence of the (possibly 
poor) predictive power of our AR(8) models, we also used ex-post observed 
marginal rates of substitution in equation [3]. The so obtained ex·ante real 
rates exhibited lower correlations for all considered countries and 
preferences. 
(13) Choosing an intermediate value for ). (.4) does not provide higher 
correlations. 
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framework choice, it can be said that I-year ex-post real interest rates 
seem to be a poor proxy for ex-ante real rates. It must also be pointed that 
this result, which is common to the four countries, is obtained despite 
national consumption data displaying rather different patterns, as Figure 
1 shows. 
Given that ex-ante and ex-post real rates behave so differently, it is worth 
analysing now whether inflation premia or inflation expectation errors are 
the main explanatory factor behind those differences. This is the aim of 
next the section. 
3.2_ Inflation Expectations and Risk Premia 
As shown in our theoretical section, the choice of parameters determining 
the stochastic discount factor (i.e. MRS,.,) crucially affects the joint 
evolution of those two unknown variables. Thus, the main aim of this 
section is to shed light on the implications for expectation errors and risk 
premia of different preference assumptions. This is not an easy task since 
our approach does not allow us to know which is the right utility function. 
The strategy we have adopted is the following. First, we look at those 
utility functions yielding the ex-ante real rates which exhibit the highest 
correlation with the ex-post rate, i.e., we consider those cases in which the 
ex-post real rate would be a better proxy for the unobservable ex-ante real 
rate. And second, we analyse how the results change when other 
preferences providing ex-ante rates less volatile than the ex-post rate are 
allowed for. 
Thus, Figures 3 to 6 show for each country in our sample bounds on 
inflation expectations corresponding to that preference specification 
providing the model-generated ex-ante real interest closest to the ex-post 
rate -i.e. that with the highest correlation among those with a variance 
lower than that of the ex-post rate. 
Figures 4 and 6 present a similar picture in terms of the band-width of the 
inflation expectations bounds. In those cases (Spain and the US), we find 
that inflation expectations bounds are very closely related and move 
together. This clearly indicates that risk premium terms are quantitatively 
-
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small and rather stable for the sample periods at hand. In those cases, 
what mainly seems to determine the differences between ex·post and ex· 
ante real interest rates are inflation expectation errors. 
The evidence for France and UK is somewhat different. As it is apparent 
from Figures 3 and 5, the band-width for inflation expectations has 
increased relative to the evidence presented for the US and Spain. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the inflation bounds also reflect relatively long 
periods of under- and overpredictions, less clear-cut for the UK. 
The foregoing comments are based on the preference specifications 
providing the ex-ante real rates the closest to the ex-post real rate. How 
robust are the results to changes in the utility functions? The effects of 
considering alternative preferences can be briefly summarised as follows: 
the higher the values of )., 1<1> I and, particularly y , the wider the bands 
for inflation expectations. Comparing Figure 5 to Figures 4 and 6 gives a 
good example of how an increase in y from .l to 1.5 -higher values tend 
to produce too volatile ex-ante real rates- affect the width of the band. 
Similarly, Figure 6 in comparison to Figure 4 shows that increasing 
). from .2 to .8 has a much lower effect. Finally, increases in 1<1> I have 
been found to produce intermediate effects on the band width. 
As to the implications for the analysis of wider expectation bands, as 
commented at the beginning of this section, we are bounding inflation 
expectations. We are not estimating them. Thus, it should be clear that 
the wider the bands, the lower their informational content. Therefore, in 
cases in which bands are relatively wide, it is not possible to conclude 
whether inflation premia or expectation error are behind the differences 
between ex-post and ex-ante real rates."" 
(14) At this point, the main message emerging from Figures 3 to 6 can 
be reinforced by the available direct estimates of inflation premia. Thus, 
Alonso and Ayuso (1996) estimated inflation premia below 40 basis points 
for Spain; Soderlind (1995) found inflation premia below 30 basis points 
for the American economy and, finally, Levind and Copeland (1993) 
estimated the sum of the inflation premium and the (always negative) 
Jensen inequality term to be around -.16 basis points in UK. 
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Before concluding this section, one additional comment is in order, related 
to our choice of a single value for � . As noted before, such a choice 
affects the mean value of the model-generated real interest rates and, 
thus, the mean level of the inflation expectation bands presented. For that 
reason, it is important to highlight that, by allowing � to vary, the bands 
can be moved up or down but without any change in their patterns. By 
doing this, overprediction (underprediction) episodes would be removed 
only by enlarging the existing underprediction (overprediction) ones. This 
is true even for quite wide bands, as in Figure 5. 
A reliable � estimate would allow for a deeper analysis of the rationale 
behind the over- or underprediction episodes. This has been done for the 
Spanish case in Ayuso and Lopez-Salido (1996). They found a clear 
overprediction episode following the relatively brisk disinflationary process 
in the early 80s, which could be justified if agents had doubts about the 
permanent or transitory nature of the process. 
By way of a summary, after having showed significant differences in ex­
ante and ex-post real interest rates in the previous section, the empirical 
evidence in this section points to inflation expectation errors as the main 
factor behind such discrepancies in those cases in which the ex-post real 
interest rate could be a better proxy for the unobservable ex-ante rates. In 
these cases, the other potential wedge between both interest rates, i.e. 
inflation premia, seems to play a minor role. For other preferences for 
which ex-post rates are a worse proxy, high values of 1411 and, mainly, 
of y , render our approach less conclusive on the relative importance of 
expectation errors and risk premia. 
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that the evidence in Figures 3 
to 6 is in line with several different recent works that have, on the one 
hand, detected relatively long periods in which agents fail to correctly 
forecast inflation and, moreover, offered a theoretical framework in which 
those expectation errors do not imply irrational agents. Thus, for the UK, 
King (1996) also shows relatively long inflation overprediction periods 
since 1982 which are justified in terms of a disinflationary process in 
which both, agents and the central bank do not immediately learn about 
the other's reactions to their decisions. For the US economy, the existence 
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of lasting overprediction episodes has been recently stressed from a 
different perspective by Ceccheti (1996) and Watson (1996). Finally, 
overpredicting periods during disinflationary processes have also been 
detected in Canada (Ragan, 1995), New-Zealand (Walsh, 1996) or 
Denmark (Christensen, 1996), among others. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Non-observable ex·ante real interest rates are commonly proxied by the so­
called ex-post real interest rates, i.e., the difference between the nominal 
interest rate and the ex-post observed inflation rate. Ex·post rates, 
however, can be a misleading proxy if nominal interest rates include a 
non-negligible inflation risk premium or agents' inflation expectation 
errors are, ex-post, far from the usual zero-mean white-noise case. 
In this paper we have shown how the CCAPM provides a simple and 
integrated framework to jointly estimate the ex-ante real interest rate, 
(bounds on) inflation premia and (bounds on) expectation errors. Thus, this 
framework allows not only for a comparison of ex-ante and ex·post real 
rates, but also provides an explanation of their discrepancies. 
Using data on four different economies (France, Spain, UK and US) and 
considering three different utility function families and a wide range for 
their corresponding parameters, we have illustrated that 1-year ex·post 
real interest rates are very different from the model-generated ex·ante 
rates. Irrespective of the country and the preference specification, both 
interest rates display a markedly different pattern, the maximum 
correlation between them oscillating between .20 (France) and .62 (UK). 
For the ex-ante real rates showing the highest correlation with the ex-post 
real rate, the discrepancy between both series seems to be mainly 
explained in terms of agents' inflation expectation errors, the inflation 
premia playing a minor role. For other preference specifications, high 
values of y (and, to a lesser extent, of 14> I ), render our approach less 
conclusive on the relative importance of each wedge between ex-ante and 
ex-post real interest rates. Although this is still an open question in the 
- 21-
literature, the existence of relatively lasting inflation expectation errors is 
in line with several different recent works that have detected relatively 
long periods in which agents fail to correctly forecast inflation and, 
moreover, offered a theoretical framework in which those expectation 
errors do not imply irrational agents. These works emphasise the role of 
information problems and learning processes in the search for an optimal 
monetary policy. 
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Table 1. Correlation between ex-ante and ex-post I-year real interest rates 
and their standard deviations: FRANCE 1978.1-1995.1II. 
PREFERENCES Y =.1 .5 1.5 5 10 
ISOELASTIC .04 .21 .63 2.34 4.90 
.146 .144 .139 .126 .100 
HABITSIDURAB. .02 .10 .30 1.02 .' 2.15 
'- = -.8 (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
-.2 .02 .08 .23 .75 1.53 
.069 .070 .071 .074 .078 
.2 .07 .034 1.03 3.48 12.8 
.098 .097 .093 .098 .059 
.8 2.11 15.0 (*) (*) (*) 
.025 (-) ( -) (-) (-) 
ABEL .27 .23 .37 2.15 4.71 
cI> = -.75 .195 .158 .132 .154 .115 
-.25 .08 .12 .36 2.21 4.85 
.199 .134 .136 .135 .105 
.25 .14 .27 .53 2.34 5.02 
(-) .030 .068 .113 .095 
.75 .34 .51 .80 2.53 5.22 
(-) ( -) .028 .090 .084 
Notes: 1. In each s q uare the to , til p gu re IS the standard deViatIOn ot the ex-
ante I-year real interest rate and the bottom figure the correlation 
between that rate and the ex-post one. 
2. The standard deviation of ex-post I-year real interest rate is 2.92, which 
implies an upper bound for that of ex-ante rate of 3.05. Shaded squares 
contain standard deviations lower than the bound. 
3. (-) indicates a negative correlation and (*) a st.dev. higher than 100. 
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Table 2. Correlation between ex-ante and ex-post I-year real interest rates 
and their standard deviations: SPAIN 1979.1II-1995.IV. 
PREFERENCES Y =.1 .5 1.5 5 10 
ISOELASTIC .12 .60 1.85 9.26 19.5 
.476 .475 .473 .396 .385 
HABITSIDURAB. .13 .63 1.95 7.00 15.49 
.. = -.8 .527 .527 .526 .524 .522 
-.2 .12 .62 1.91 6.87 15.16 
.532 .532 .532 .530 .527 
.2 .12 .59 1.79 6.42 14.04 
.5372 .5371 .5369 .5366 .5370 
.8 .45 2.20 6.16 23.02 286 
(-) ( -) (-) (-) (-) 
ABEL 1.05 1.57 2.89 10.5 20.6 
<I> = -.75 .529 .510 .491 .386 .380 
-.25 .43 .93 2.21 9.43 19.3 
.519 .494 .484 .395 .386 
.25 .17 .28 1.52 8.26 18.1 
(-) .475 .476 .405 .392 
.75 .76 .24 .84 7.13 16.8 
( -) (-) .474 .416 .397 
Notes: 1. In each square, the top figure is the standard deviation of the ex­
ante I-year real interest rate and the bottom figure the correlation 
between that rate and the ex-post one. 
2. The standard deviation of ex-post I-year real interest rate is 2.56, which 
implies an upper bound for that of ex-ante rate of 2.67. Shaded squares 
contain standard deviations lower than the bound. 
3. (-) indicates a negative correlation. 
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Table 3. Correlation between ex·ante and ex·post I-year real interest rates 
and their standard deviations: UK 1973.I-1995.IIL 
PREFERENCES y = . 1 .5 1.5 5 10 
ISOELASTIC 5.18 5.22 5.37 7.76 9.86 
.464 .478 .508 .541 .491 
HABITSIDURAB. 5.26 5.23 5.17 5.16 6.07 
A = -.8 
(-) (-) ( -) .027 .104 
-.2 3.48 3.51 3.64 4.59 6.84 
.544 .555 .574 .570 .481 
.2 4.96 4.99 5.17 6.77 10.6 
.608 .617 .621 .512 .318 
.8 4.90 21.5 40.3 13.5 47.1 
(-) (-) (-) .127 (-) 
ABEL 4.97 3.98 3.91 7.89 10.3 
<I> = -.75 .564 .399 .513 .587 .510 
-.25 4.07 3.66 4.62 7.86 10.1 
.497 .461 .575 .595 .516 
.25 4.95 4.18 4.99 7.74 9.27 
.509 .459 .564 .598 .521 
.75 5.33 3.94 4.25 7.52 9.66 
.533 .403 .483 .595 .524 
Notes: 1. In each square, the top figure is the standard deviation of the ex­
ante I-year real interest rate and the bottom figure the correlation 
between that rate and the ex-post one. 
2. The standard deviation of ex-post I-year real interest rate is 5.82, which 
implies an upper bound for that of ex-ante rate of 6.07. Shaded squares 
contain standard deviations lower than the bound. 
3. (-) indicates a negative correlation. 
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Table 4. Correlation between ex-ante and ex-post 1-year real interest rates 
and their standard deviations: US 1973.I-1995.III. 
PREFERENCES y ;.1 .5 1.5 5 10 
ISOELASTIC 5.05 5.09 5.27 12.2 18.2 
.332 .342 .361 .369 .329 
HABITSIDURAB. 5.82 5.88 6.12 7.85 12.3 
.. ; -.8 .229 .235 .248 .259 .230 
-.2 5.89 5.93 6.12 7.64 11.8 
.255 .261 .271 .275 .237 
.2 6.06 6.12 6.33 7.69 11.4 
.329 .332 .335 .320 .259 
.8 2.44 4.87 (*) (*) (*) 
.221 ( -) .047 .268 (-) 
ABEL 5.05 4.86 5.46 11.4 17.5 
4> ; -.75 .326 .280 .311 .348 .297 
-.25 4.80 5.11 5.90 11.0 16.8 
.278 .292 .321 .363 .308 
.25 6.29 6.18 6.49 10.6 16.1 
.374 .377 .348 .377 .320 
.75 5.41 7.20 6.26 10.3 15.4 
.344 .373 .385 .390 .331 
Notes: 1. In each square, the top figure is the standard deviation of the ex­
ante 1-year real interest rate and the bottom figure the correlation 
between that rate and the ex-post one. 
2. The standard deviation of ex-post 1-year real interest rate is 3.70, which 
implies an upper bound for that of ex-ante rate of 3.86. Shaded squares 
contain standard deviations lower than the bound. 
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Figure 2. 1-year real interest rates (%) 
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Figure 2 (cont.). l -year real interest rates (%) 
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Figure 3. 1-year-ahead inflation expectations. France 
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Figure 5. 1 -year-ahead inflation expectations. UK 
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